תחילת חכמה יראת ד’ כלומר התחלת החכמה הוא היראה, וכמו שאמרו אם אין יראה אין חכמה ואם אין חכמה אין יראה והקשו איזה מהם קודם? והענין כי במחשבה הוא התכלית תחילה ואחר כך החכמה היאך לעשות,
והיראה הוא התכלית ולכן במחשבה הוא היראה תחילה ואם אין יראה אין חכמה, ובמעשה הוא חכמה תחילה, וזהו אם אין חכמה אין יראה

וזהו שאמר כאן תכלית חכמה – פירוש, במחשבה התחלת ותכלית החכמה היא היראה

Rav Wolbe (Alei Shur II, page 495) explains:

נמצינו למדים בזה כי תכלית הכל היא היראה, ולמעשה צריכים להתחיל בחכמה. אולם יש להבין מזה גם כאשר ניגשים לעסק החכמה, צריכה המחשבה להיות להגיע על ידי זה ליראה

אמנם התכלית היא – יראה.

Thank you. I am glad to see that you retract your incorrect statement that “Awe is a prerequisite and not a result of learning.” It is both.

Now, if you’ll pay attention to what I wrote, I said: “He disagrees with setting up one’s learning having in mind only to reach Yiras Shamayim. [READ - MOTIVATION] You have to fill yourself up with Torah in all of its facets, for its own sake, or the Yirah is nothing but a shell”

You actually quote the section where he says exactly that.

The debate on saving lives – let’s skip all the dancing around clear statements from Amudei Horaah, and make it simple. Forget about the Gemara in Megillah for now. Show me a source that says that the Halachah of מצוה שאפשר לעשות על ידי אחרים one does not interrupt learning for (which I assume you agree is normative – Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 246:18 ) has exceptions of הצלת נפשות and all areas of חסד. And by your own rules, you’re limited to Rishonim quoting counter Gemaros that are clearly normative in rejecting the application to הצלת נפשות and גמילות חסדים. (Good luck – it is against the Yerushalmi Pesachim 3:7.)

In terms of practical application – think blood drive, for example.

We aren’t talking about losing sensitivities. Of course that’s wrong.

Comment by Eliyahu — July 1, 2009 @ 5:50 am

In short, the role, purpose, benefits, value etc. of learning as a part of or as the center of one’s religious experience and differences, if any, based on whom one is addressing is an important area hashkafically, halakhically, philosophically, historically, etc. where the spectrum of opinions and factual disagreements are broad.

This is NOT how or why the story is ever told. It is told to instill a value (which is popular in chabbad and some other chassidic groups) that Talmud Torah that causes you to lose your sensitivity to the suffering and needs of others is pagum at its core. This is the clear message of the story as the chassidim who passed it down have always understood it. Al Achat Kama veKama, the message regarding a person who thinks that someone should ignore the needs of a person whose life is in danger for the sake of talmud Torah. Never mind that I can think of no real world scenario where this would be acceptable ethically.

The normative approach is: if someone needs your help to save their life – you help and all the rest of the cheshbonos can wait. someone who loses such an instinct due to his Torah learning is doing something wrong. At least according to this story.

כי התורה הקדושה מעצמה תלבישהו יראת ד’ על פניו, במעט זמן ויגיעה מועטת על זה, כי כך דרכה וסגולתה של התורה הקדושה, כמו שאמרו כל העוסק בתורה לשמה כו’ ומלבשתו ענוה ויראה

I have never in my life seen such a misrepresentation of R’ Chaim Voloziner’s shita. Yes. He says that one of the potential results of Torah study is increased yira’a but to imply from this that he somehow holds the the motivation for learning Torah should be to increase our yiraa is absurd! R’ Chaim spends two chapters explaining how yira’a is a prerequisite to proper learning of Torah and should be achieved through hitbonenus PRIOR to the learning of Torah (Shaar 4:4-5)

and he speaks directly against your shita in chapter 8: איך יעלה על לב איש לומר שזה תכלית האדם מישראל, שישים כל קביעת למודו בבנין האוצר של יראת שמים לבד, והוא אוצר ריק, ולא עלתה בידו מכל עמלו רק מצוה אחת של “ה’ אלהיך תירא” וגם אין עליה שם אוצר כלל

Further, in the entire shaar R’ Chaim makes clear that he sees yira’a as something aquired PRIMARILY through introspection and the learning of ethical tracts. The proper MOTIVATION for mainstream learning (not of mussar books) according to R’ Chaim is as he says in several places (chapter 3 of shaar 4 for one):

אבל האמת כי ענין לשמה פרוש, לשם התורה … כגון לידע ולהבין, ולהוסיף לקח ופלפול.

As for the rest of your long comments. I still stand where I did before – a section of germara is aggada based on its style and substance and (maybe maybe) based on whether the major rishonim treated it as such in their HALACHIC codes – not based on whether or not it is invoked in an halachic manner 1000 years later. For example, the fact that R’ Moshe quotes the ibn Ezra in a teshuva does not make it the ibn Ezra an halachic work.

The Ohr HaChaim that you quote above as treating the gemara in meggila as an halachic text is IMO doing nothing of the sort. In fact, it seems like his whole kashya on the taz is “even if your interpertation is right and the zechut of learning Torah is greater than hatzalat nefashot, how do you get from there to a normative chiuv of prefering learning Torah over hatzalat nefashot leMa’seh. He rejects that we learn chiuv from zechut. Although he does not say so explicitly, it seems that he is saying that an aggada that teaches you about zechut does not teach you about a normative chiuv.

Chardal, it’s not quite as simple as that. That statement of the Gemara represents the halachic BASELINE, but the actual halachah can change based on various factors, as in, for example, Sanhedrin 74a-b (which is the source “sugya” of “yaavor v’al yehareg”). That’s why we don’t “pasken” on the basis of a single statement in the Gemara. There is no such thing as a “normative halachic statement” in the Gemara because often a Gemara elsewhere qualifies that statement, and unless we know every single Gemara that even indirectly bears on it, we can’t apply it to a given circumstance. Only after taking everything into account can we establish the halachah “l’maaseh”. That is why we have Rishonim and Acharonim.

By the way, the Gemara you are looking for is not Kesubos 19a, but Yoma 82a and Pesachim 25a-b. Those Gemaras refer to someone who suffers from a life-threatening illness; the Gemara in Kesubos (and Sanhedrin) is referring to someone whom others threatened with death if he does not sin. Although the basic halachah in both cases is that we transgress anything but ג’ עבירות חמורות, the two cases are not always comparable: see, for example, the Minchas Chinuch to mitzvah 296 who distinguishes between them with regard to a non-Jew in a life-threatening situation, and compare the Rambam in Hil. Yesodei HaTorah 5:4 with what he writes in 5:6 regarding someone in such a situation who does transgress one of the ג’ עבירות).

Asserting this does not make it so. You are adducing as “proof” than an aggada is halachic … part of the same aggada. This is not in the major codes – and it is a bit silly to adduce it as an halachic argument.

You’re the one making completely unfounded assertions based on absolutely nothing. What you’re saying is that the Maharshal, the Taz, the Ben Ish Chai, the Sefer Chassidim, the Perishah, Shu”t Lev Chaim II: 248 , etc., etc. are all “a bit silly” adducing this Gemara as a Halachic argument.

You NEED sources for ANY of these assertions of yours about the strength or weakness of this being normative Halachah. One more time – the Maharshal paskened against the Beis Yosef BASED SOLELY on this “Aggada”.

The fact that occationally an achron (such as the taz) invokes an aggadic passage to make a normative point in halacha is not proof of anything.

In your book. This is not the book used by Poskim.

Especially when the answer to such an assertion by an achron is to simply point out that the aggada is missing from any normative halachic code in the rishonim

So you’re saying that NONE of the Acharonim give this answer, but since Chardal “simply points it out”, then that’s the answer. But just for informative purposes, you should take a look at the Meiri who ferrets out the practical guidelines from the vast passages of Aggadeta at the end of the first perek in Megillah there – and quotes this Gemara.

The point is that there is precious little such literature. And the presence of an achron here or there does not halachic literature make.

In your book. This is not the book the Poskim use. There is no such thing as relegating the Maharshal, the Taz, the Rishon Letzion (by the Ohr Hachayim), etc. to “not Halachic literature make”.

Should we really collect every passage of gemara that has EVER been quoted by an achron in an halachic argument and give it the status of normative halacha?

This is completely disingenuous.

Do we really want to break down the traditional scholarly approach to deviding the gemara to normative and not normative sections – that is a major break with our messorah!

You’re painting the bullseye around the arrow. You’re assuming it isn’t normative and then saying that it is in the non-normative section.

Such a statment is just a form of bullying. It is debate scare-tactics.

Turning what the Poskim consider binding material into non-binding material very much runs the risk of Megaleh Panim BaTorah. This is a very real argument in the sense that it demands that you back up your assertions.

I suggest you stick to real arguments if you want to have a shot of convincing anyone that normative halacha is to ignore sakanas nefashos for the sake of going back to the gemara.

Based on your “mesorah” of relegating the Maharshal, the Taz, etc. to “an Acharon here or there” which “isn’t Halachic literature” and waving hands with “simple answers” like “this is just Agada” which NOBODY says, but you’re saying based on NOTHING, I don’t think I have to work very hard at convincing anyone with an open mind on this issue.

I will conclude with another non-halachic story. It is said that one time the Alter Rebbe was learning with his son and a baby was crying in the other room. The son was so immeresed in his learning that he did not notice the crying. The Alter Rebbe got up, calmed the baby, and when returning to the learning told his son: ‘Torah study which makes one impervious to the anguished cries of a baby is not true Torah study. Torah study must increase our sensitivity to the suffering of others – not mute it’ – veIdach Zil Gemor.

This is a Halachic story. He was Mechuyav to calm the baby since the baby was his responsibility, and it became a Mitzvah that could not be done by others.

And speaking of debate tactics, what you’re doing here is saying that all the Acharonim who labor to reconcile the Gemara in Megillah with normative Halachah are mistaken. The real אידך זיל גמור is a story about the Alter Rebbe. This is an attempt at emotionalizing a debate on Halachic merits, which does not serve to clarify the truth.

He says it quite clearly.

שער ד פרק ח

וכי יעלה כלל על לב האדם כיון שכל קיום ושימור התבואה הוא האוצר, יעסוק כל זמנו או רובו בבנין האוצר לבד, ולא יכניס בו תבואה לעולם, כן איך יעלה על לב איש לומר שזה תכלית האדם מישראל שישים כל קביעת למודו בבנין האוצר של יראת שמים לבד והוא אוצר ריק

ולא כונו רז”ל במאמרם הנ”ל אין לו להקב”ה וכו’ אלא אוצר של יראת שמים בלבד אלא על אותה היראה שבתוכה מונחים המון תבואות

“Awe is a prerequisite and not a result of learning.”

נפש החיים שם פרק ט

כי התורה הקדושה מעצמה תלבישהו יראת ד’ על פניו, במעט זמן ויגיעה מועטת על זה, כי כך דרכה וסגולתה של התורה הקדושה, כמו שאמרו כל העוסק בתורה לשמה כו’ ומלבשתו ענוה ויראה

רש”י יומא עב עמוד ב ד”ה ותרעא לדרתיה

שהתורה אינה אלא שער ליכנס בה ליראת שמים

(With all due respect, if you’re not going to look it up carefully yourself, at least you could do me the courtesy of asking where my source for an idea is, instead of flatly denying that it exists.)

“with an opportunity to save lives vs. learning Torah should prefer to continue learning. I am a bit asstounded that you consider this to be normative psak (although I am sure you will find plenty of sources to support it).”

So why would you be astounded? You’re correct that there are plenty of sources for this – that when it can be done by others, you don’t. Do you have any sources to the contrary?

“As a matter of practicality, I would consider someone who is faced with such a “dilemma” and who then proceeds to check whether anyone else can take care of the sakkanat nefashos so that he can go back to the Gemara to be in violation of רבי חנניה בן דוסא’s warning.”

That’s right, if he has to check and he may waste precious time in saving his life. But as an equal matter of practicality, if there are, say, people swimming in camp and people learning in camp, and one of the campers is missing, and you need precisely five volunteers to search for him, so, generally, go to the pool, not the Beis Medrash. And the people in the Beis Medrash, unless time is of essence, or they have some particular expertise or whatnot, should point to the pool. This is 100% normative, in line with the Rambam. Who says differently?

He’s saying an even bigger Chiddush than the Taz. He is taking the Gemara practically, and he is saying that even if you think you are in a unique position to save lives, like קרוב למלכות, you shouldn’t if it will take you away from Torah study, unless it is certain that it is a Pikuach Nefesh situation.

This is a huge chiddush, because the Beis Yosef in Yoreh Deah 178 says (regarding the Hetter to violate B’chukoseihem for krovim lamalchus):

כיון דמדאורייתא אסירי הנך מילי היאך היה כח ביד חכמים להתיר איסור תורה לקרובי המלכות ויש לומר דמשום הצלת ישראל יש כח בידם להתיר דכשיש ישראל קרובים למלכות עומדים בפרץ לבטל הגזירות

(The Beis Yosef has another approach that this is specific to בחוקותיהםsince the parameters are not clearly defined in the Torah) but the Beis Yosef has as an acceptable, viable approach להלכה that you can violate איסורים דאורייתא as a קרוב למלכות for the sake of precisely the situation the Ben Ish Chai is talking about, potential Hatzalas Nefashos, yet the BIC is saying you CAN’T interrupt Torah study!

“Similarly, chovos halevovos says that the biggest zchus a person can have is to be mezakeh the rabim. One could argue that mordechai saving klal yisrael and inspiring their teshuva (kimu v’kiblu) is therefore a bigger zchus than continuing to learn in the beis medrash.”

I don’t see the similarity, but in any event:

תנא דבי אליהו זוטא פרק ה

בכל יום יוצאין מלאכי חבלה מלפני הקב”ה לחבל את כל העולם כולו, ואלמלא בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות שתלמידי חכמים יושבים בהם ועוסקים בדברי תורה היו מחבלים את כל העולם כולו

נפש החיים שער ד פרק כה
אם היה ח”ו העולם פנוי לגמרי אפילו רגע אחת ממש מעסק והתבוננות עם סגולה בתורה הקדושה, תיכף כרגע היו כל העולמות נחרבים ונבטלים ממציאות לגמרי ח”ו… ואף גם איש אחד מישראל לבד רב כחו, שבידו להעמיד ולקיים את כל העולמות והבריאה בכללה, על ידי עסקו והתבוננותו בתורה הקדושה לשמה, כמו שאמרו בחלק צט ע”ב כל העוסק בתורה לשמה וכו’ רבי יוחנן אמר אף מגין על כל העולם כולו

פסחים פז ע”א
אני חומה ושדי כמגדלות, חומה זו תורה ושדי כמגדלות אלו תלמידי חכמים, וברש”י שמגינים על הדור

So Torah study is being mezakeh the rabbim, vis-a-vis hatzalas nefashos, besides all the other benefits. The chovos halevavos gives no indication as to how to weigh which zikkui harabim is the greater.

Asserting this does not make it so. You are adducing as “proof” than an aggada is halachic … part of the same aggada. This is not in the major codes – and it is a bit silly to adduce it as an halachic argument. (besides, building the beit haMikdash is not the command of an individual but of the klal, it applies only after you go into eretz Yisrael and not before, and a dozen other halachic points can be made why this aggada is more likely to be making a point about values and not normative halacha).

The fact that occationally an achron (such as the taz) invokes an aggadic passage to make a normative point in halacha is not proof of anything. The achronim are full of aggadic invocations in their piskei halacha – this does not turn an aggadic source into something it is not. Especially when the answer to such an assertion by an achron is to simply point out that the aggada is missing from any normative halachic code in the rishonim (unless you want to consider sefer hassidim a normative halachic source – which IMO is not a very valid position, it has not traditionaly been invoked as an halachic source and frankly – some of the norms it prescribes are very out there and seem to have very little connection to the gemara)

> It absolutely does have Halachic impact and nobody has the right to attribute their own understanding of it and reduce it to a non-binding piece of Gemara without reference to the Halachic literature that applies it L’halachah.

The point is that there is precious little such literature. And the presence of an achron here or there does not halachic literature make. Should we really collect every passage of gemara that has EVER been quoted by an achron in an halachic argument and give it the status of normative halacha? Do we really want to break down the traditional scholarly approach to deviding the gemara to normative and not normative sections – that is a major break with our messorah!

>Those who do so run the risk of being Megaleh Panim BaTorah.

Such a statment is just a form of bullying. It is debate scare-tactics. I suggest you stick to real arguments if you want to have a shot of convincing anyone that normative halacha is to ignore sakanas nefashos for the sake of going back to the gemara.

I will conclude with another non-halachic story. It is said that one time the Alter Rebbe was learning with his son and a baby was crying in the other room. The son was so immeresed in his learning that he did not notice the crying. The Alter Rebbe got up, calmed the baby, and when returning to the learning told his son: ‘Torah study which makes one impervious to the anguished cries of a baby is not true Torah study. Torah study must increase our sensitivity to the suffering of others – not mute it’ – veIdach Zil Gemor.

אין לך דבר שעומד בפני פיקוח נפש אלא עבודה זרה וגלוי עריות ושפיכות דמים בלבד

This is the clear halachic normative statement that is most commonly applied. The Aggada in megilla can be easily understood as talking about schar mitzva or another such construct as opposed to discussing a normative chiuv.

Only he does not say this. He is pretty clear that there are two motivations for Torah learning. First, the effect it has on the higher worlds and second, to understand the sugya you are learning (which he defines as Torah liShma. He is also very clear that the preferable normative motivation is the second and the first should only be a far afterthought (this is of course in contra-distinction to the chassidic view as articulated in the Tanya where dveikut and affecting the higher worlds is the primary purpose of Torah study).

In fact, I would assume that R’ Chaim Voloziner would go in the footsteps of the Gra who saw ir’at shamaim as a pre-requisite to proper Torah learning. He would probably invoke the mishna in avot:

רבי חנניה בן דוסא אומר, כל שיראת חטאו קודמת לחכמתו, חכמתו מתקיימת; וכל שחכמתו קודמת ליראת חטאו, אין חכמתו מתקיימת.

Awe is a prerequisite and not a result of learning. We all know of many scholars who could have wiped the floor with any of us in Torah knowledge but who would not be called paragons of piety.

Now regarding your halachic assertions above that someone who is faced with an opportunity to save lives vs. learning Torah should prefer to continue learning. I am a bit asstounded that you consider this to be normative psak (although I am sure you will find plenty of sources to support it). As a matter of practicality, I would consider someone who is faced with such a “dilemma” and who then proceeds to check whether anyone else can take care of the sakkanat nefashos so that he can go back to the Gemara to be in violation of רבי חנניה בן דוסא’s warning.

It is. See the Turei Zahav I quoted above – just like Ezra did not leave Bavel in order to build the Beis Hamikdash because someone else (Zerubavel) was taking care of it, and therefore learning Torah took precedence in practice , so too any Hatzalas Nefashos that can be done by anyone else should not be done by people learning, and if you are in the unfortunate circumstance of having to save a life instead of learn Torah, you have lost out! That’s what the Taz says, that’s what the Chofetz Chaim says (Toras Habayis Chapter 5 – “the one who learns has accomplished more”), that’s why the GRA’s father didn’t let him study medicine (because he would have been in the unfortunate position of having to stop learning to save lives!) (And, again, do I find this easy? Not at all! But that’s what Chazal say and noone disagrees with this. So it’s true no matter how much people don’t like it or oppose it)

“It is a davar aggada that would be understood in many different ways depending on a person’s a priori hashkafa.”

It is NOT a Hashkafic question, just as Ezra *practically* did not leave Baruch to build the Beis Hamikdash. The Maharshal (in that Taz) uses THAT statement to question the Psak of the Shulchan Aruch (The Maharshal thought that money allocated for Torah study should not be reallocated to save lives!) The Taz tempers the statement as above, but it remains 100% Halachic. Someone who would stop his learning to save a life when someone else is available would be making the wrong choice! (See Perishah 251:(13), Sefer Chassidim 1005)

“There is certainly no heter to respond to sakanat nefashot with Torah study in place of actual direct action – at least not from any responsible Rav that I know.”

That’s not the Halachic import of the statement.

“So in the end, we are left with an aggadic statement that has no normative halachic impact and to which everyone will attribute their own metaphysical understanding.”

This is just false. It absolutely does have Halachic impact and nobody has the right to attribute their own understanding of it and reduce it to a non-binding piece of Gemara without reference to the Halachic literature that applies it L’halachah. Those who do so run the risk of being Megaleh Panim BaTorah.

Anyhow, I’ve stated my case.

A similar story is related in Jonathan Rosenblum’s “R. Yaakov” biograpahy(Artscroll, chapter of “R. Yaakov in His Younger Years”), quoting a former student of R. Chaim who went on to work with Einstein on the Theory of Relativity.

This person came to visit Slabodka, and students asked him to compare both of his eminent teachers. He said, as I recall, that R. Chaim was a better teacher and could explain things better, but Einstein a greater genius.

R Yaakov, however, argued that the student only studied under R. Chaim in his youth, and could not appreciate his wisdom. The story concludes that the mathematician was impressed with R. Yaakov’s quick wit(as well as his command of physics).

On the contrary, it certainly does matter. Another blog recently unearthed a statement by a currently living Gadol who apparently believes that non-Jews have 33 teeth while Jews only have 32 because he found a midrash that says so! If I am going to look at a psak in medical halacha, I first want to be sure that the posek had an understanding of the science he is writing about. Otherwise, how can I properly apply it?

> When the Talmud tells us ein ha-olam mitkayem ella al hevel pihem shel tinokot shel beit rabban

It also rests on Torah, Avodah and Gemillus Chasadim, and Din, Shalom and Emez.